



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

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Indications of Political Instability in Key Countries

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February 1986

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*GI IPI 86-001
February 1986*

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This quarterly was produced by and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and suggestions are welcome and may be directed to

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Preface

This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely warning of significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 November through 31 January, examines events and processes that could lead to major regime or policy changes. The paper assesses our levels of concern regarding the potential for instability in the short term and over the next two years through the consistent application of 24 indicators.

The quarterly includes an overview of developments during the quarter, and the following three parts:

- Part 1 includes a brief narrative assessment of each country, and country-specific tables tracing significant political and economic changes during the past two years. The 30 countries we assess have been identified as particularly salient to US interests because they are strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, key US friends or allies, geographically close to the United States, or especially influential in the Third World.
- Part 2 presents a more detailed analysis of select countries in which there have been developments of special interest. Included in each assessment are subsections listing indicators to be watched with reference to the scenarios that we believe are most likely to unfold and alternative scenarios.
- Part 3 provides a reference list of 85 questions keyed to the 24 indicators.

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Status of Key Indicators

*Developments in
Fourth Quarter, 1985,
and Prospects*

Legend

Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern

▲ Concern has increased since last quarter

▼ Concern has decreased since last quarter

| | | Social change/conflict | Economic factors | Opposition activities | Military attitudes/ activities | External factors | Regime activities/ capabilities | Concern for policy or irregular regime change during next six months | Concern for policy or irregular regime change six months to two years |
|--------------------------|--------------|------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------------|--|---|
| Latin America | Mexico | | | | | | | | ▲ |
| | El Salvador | | | | | | | | |
| | Guatemala | | | | | | | ▼ | |
| | Honduras | | | | | | | | |
| | Panama | | | ▲ | | | | | |
| | Colombia | | | | | | | | |
| | Venezuela | | | | | | | ▼ | ▼ |
| | Peru | | | | | | | | |
| | Brazil | | | | ▼ | | | | |
| | Argentina | | | | | | | | |
| | Chile | | | | | | | | |
| Europe | Spain | | | | | | | | |
| | Greece | | | | | | | | |
| | Turkey | | | | | | | | |
| Near East and South Asia | Morocco | | | | | | | | |
| | Egypt | | | | | | | | |
| | Sudan | | | | | | | | |
| | Saudi Arabia | | | | | | | | |
| | Iraq | | | | ▲ | | ▲ | ▲ | |
| | Iran | | | | | | | | |
| | Pakistan | | | | | | | | |
| | India | ▼ | | | | | | | ▼ |
| Africa | Nigeria | | | | | | | ▲ | |
| | Somalia | | | | | | | | |
| | Kenya | | | | ▲ | | | ▲ | |
| | Zaire | | | | | | | | |
| | South Africa | | | | | | | | |
| East Asia | Philippines | | | | | | | | |
| | Indonesia | | ▲ | | | | | | |
| | South Korea | | | | | | | ▲ | |

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Indications of Political Instability in Key Countries

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Summary: Levels of Concern

This quarter, concern has been raised to high levels for the short-term stability of *Nigeria*, *Iraq*, and *South Korea*. We continue to have serious or substantial concern that regime or major policy change could occur during the next six months in *Sudan*, *Iran*, or the *Philippines*:

- *Nigerian* President Babangida's brief honeymoon period following last August's military coup ended with the arrest in December of more than 50 officers charged with coup plotting.
- The *Iraqi* regime—already hampered by serious morale problems stemming from its five-year-old war with Iran—must cope with the renewed threat of an Iranian invasion, a spreading Kurdish insurgency, and declining oil prices.
- In *South Korea*, we are concerned that President Chun may take steps ensuring his continued rule beyond 1988 that would unify a broad-based opposition and trigger widespread protests.
- Elections scheduled for late April in *Sudan* may be postponed or a new interim military regime formed if political differences spark major civil disorder.
- Khomeini's uncertain health and factional rivalries continue to provide an unsettled political climate in *Iran*.
- We are concerned that in the *Philippines* a blatantly fraudulent election or a move by Marcos to call off elections would spur widespread unrest.

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Regime-threatening instability over the next two years is of substantial concern in several Central and South American countries. The governments of *El Salvador*, *Guatemala*, *Honduras*, and *Panama* must forge an internal consensus on democratic rule in highly factionalized societies. *Peruvian* President Garcia faces long-term economic problems and strained relations with the security forces. *Chilean* President Pinochet is likely to lose the support of the military junta if he refuses to move toward an accelerated transition to civilian rule and if terrorist incidents and public unrest escalate. In *Kenya*, grumbling by the military over pay, appointments, and ethnic discrimination in recruiting have led us to raise our concern slightly about short-term prospects for regime change.

The prospect for a continued decline in oil prices poses a difficult political challenge for *Mexico's* de la Madrid. Spending to garner votes in gubernatorial elections later this year will likely aggravate difficulties with creditors and the International Monetary Fund over meeting economic performance targets. We are concerned that a dramatic fall in oil revenues

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would spur an abrupt shift in Mexican economic and debt policies. In *Venezuela*, party elections have consolidated support for President Lusinchi and his wing of the majority party, and, as a result, we believe the outlook for regime stability has improved. We also have lowered our concern about the longer term prospects for instability in *India* because of Prime Minister Gandhi's leadership and conciliatory initiatives that have reduced incidents of religious discontent and terrorism, although he is still a high-risk target for assassination.

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Part 1. Developments and Trends

The six categories of indicators used in the following charts are drawn from the 85 questions presented in Part 3. The *social change/conflict* indicators examine developments such as labor or religious unrest that could undermine the regime's legitimacy and ability to rule effectively. The *economic factors* link various dimensions of economic performance to potential instability. *Opposition activities* assess whether the opposition can mobilize effective antiregime activity or carry out acts that undermine public security. The *military attitude/activities* category addresses the military's degree of dissatisfaction with regime policies, involvement in coup plotting, and behavior relevant to the political process. The *external factors* category looks at foreign influences that could affect internal stability. Finally, the *regime capabilities/actions* category focuses on what the government is doing that could lessen popular support, otherwise undermine its authority, and affect its ability to govern efficiently.

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Mexico:
Selected Instability Indicators

The ongoing deterioration of the economy poses the most difficult political challenge to the government. The President is expected to increase spending in states with elections later this year. Public tolerance for austerity is waning and some military officers are grumbling. The soft oil market is likely to require that a greater share of public spending be funded internally, which could pose problems with the IMF and foreign creditors.

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During next six months

During next six months to two years

Legend

○ Not of concern

Low concern

Moderate concern

● Substantial concern

● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | | | | | | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | ○ | ○ | | | | | |
| | Capital flight | | | | | | ● | ● | ● |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ● | ● | | | | | | |
| | Food/energy shortages | | | | | | | | |
| | Inflation | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | | | | | | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | | | | | | | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | | | | | | | ○ | ○ |

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El Salvador:
Selected Instability Indicators

President Duarte's relations with the military have been strained by his handling of the negotiations to win the release of his daughter, his perceived failure to discipline corrupt officials, and his indecisive moves in connection with a church-sponsored Christmas truce. The High Command, however, remains loyal and does not appear inclined to challenge the government directly. In the coming months Duarte probably will be preoccupied with managing leftist agitation in the labor sector prompted by the implementation of his belt-tightening economic stabilization package.

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○ During next six months
● During next six months to two years

Legend

○ Not of concern
○ Low concern
○ Moderate concern
● Substantial concern
● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Inflation | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

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Guatemala^a:**Selected Instability Indicators**

President Vinicio Cerezo is still buoyed by his decisive election victory in December, but he faces difficult economic and political challenges—including lack of public support for his austerity measures, demands from organized labor for higher wages and benefits, and the prospect of continued political violence initiated by extremists on the right and left. Opposition to reform from business and the military also could undermine his electoral mandate.

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^a See Part 2 for detailed discussion.

During next six months

● During next six months to two years

Legend

○ Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern

● Substantial concern
● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● | ● |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Capital flight | | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | ● | ● |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ● | ● |
| | Inflation | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● | ● |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | | | | | | | |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | | | | | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | | | | | | | | |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | | | | | | | | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | | | | | | | | |
| External factors | External support for government | | | | | | | | |
| | External support for opposition | | | | | | | | |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | | | | | | | | |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | | | | | | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ● | | | | | | | |

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Secret**Honduras:****Selected Instability Indicators**

Newly inaugurated President Azcona will probably have a short political honeymoon. He is struggling with how much support to provide anti-Sandinista insurgents, as well as how to handle dead-locked border talks with El Salvador and revive the stalled economy. Although Azcona appears to enjoy good relations with the military high command, some senior officers still oppose him and most likely will try to undermine his authority. Residual political infighting from last year's campaign also is likely to deprive him of much-needed cooperation from the new Congress.

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During next six months● *During next six months to two years***Legend**○ *Not of concern**Low concern**Moderate concern*● *Substantial concern*● *Serious concern*

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | | | | | | | |
| | Capital flight | | | | | | | | |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | | | | | | | | |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | | | | | | | |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | | | | | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | | | | | | | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | | |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | | | | | | | | |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | | | | |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | | | | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

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Panama:
Selected Instability Indicators

The Delvalle regime's failure to develop a coherent economic policy may portend a new financial—and political—crisis in 1986. Defense Chief Noriega, the most likely leader of any maneuver against the President, does not appear to be scheming actively, and he recently installed military officers loyal to him in some important positions in the government and the ruling party. Even so, if the current, widespread perception in Panama—that Delvalle has no economic policy and lacks basic competence—persists, regime prospects may become clouded.

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During next six months

During next six months to two years

Legend

○ Not of concern
 Low concern
 Moderate concern

● Substantial concern
 ● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | ○ | | | ○ | ○ | | |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |

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Secret**Colombia:****Selected Instability Indicators**

Guerrilla violence is likely to intensify as the presidential election scheduled for May approaches. Only one guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, still adheres to the cease-fire negotiated by President Betancur in 1984, and some of its members have clashed with Army patrols. Betancur probably will authorize expanded operations against M-19 guerrillas and some smaller groups, but the military will be hard pressed if the larger, well-organized Revolutionary Armed Forces breaks the truce.

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During next six months
During next six months to two years

Legend

○ *Not of concern*
 ○ *Low concern*
 ○ *Moderate concern*

● *Substantial concern*
 ● *Serious concern*

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307928 1-86

25X1

Secret

Secret

Venezuela:**Selected Instability Indicators**

President Lusinchi's austere economic adjustment program continues to draw broad public support. The measures have restored balance to Venezuela's external accounts but failed to revive the domestic economy. A severe drop in oil prices would assure an eighth year of economic stagnation. This scenario would probably disturb the otherwise quiet political scene, but not threaten Lusinchi, who most likely can manage the political fallout from a softer oil market. Party elections last quarter consolidated support for Lusinchi and his party wing.

25X1

- During next six months
○ During next six months to two years

Legend

- Not of concern
● Low concern
⊗ Moderate concern
⊙ Substantial concern
● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | ○ | ○ | ⊗ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● | ● |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Capital flight | ⊗ | ● | ● | ⊗ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ⊗ | ● | ● | ⊗ | ● | ⊗ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | ⊗ | ● | ● | ⊗ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307929 1.86

25X1

Secret

Secret**Peru^a:****Selected Instability Indicators**

President Garcia's popularity remains his best protection from opposition challenges. His solitary decisionmaking style, however, has antagonized the political left and some members of his Cabinet. Nationalistic economic policies, while popular, have not boosted economic recovery. Garcia also faces growing internal security problems and his reformist policies, anticorruption campaign, and failure to formulate a clear counterinsurgency strategy continue to strain relations with Peru's security forces.

^a See Part 2 for detailed discussion.

25X1

○ During next six months

● During next six months to two years

Legend

○ Not of concern
○ Low concern
○ Moderate concern

● Substantial concern
● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Capital flight | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | | |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | | | | | | ● | | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | | | | | | | | |
| | Inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | | | | | | | | |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | | | | | | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Public support | | | | | | | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | | | | | ● | ● |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | | | | | | | |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ● | ● | | | | | ● | ● |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | | | | | | | | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | | | | | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | | |
| | Security capabilities | | | | | | | | |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | | ○ | ○ |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307930 1-86

25X1

Secret

Secret

Brazil:
Selected Instability Indicators

President Sarney has emerged with a broader base of support following the nationwide municipal elections last fall. The leftwing parties have made gains, however, and they plan to press for early direct presidential elections. The area where Sarney could most readily trip up—giving his adversaries ammunition—is the economy; inflation may heat up in the coming months as a result of current stimulative policies. Nonetheless, Sarney probably stands a better-than-even chance of fending off these potential problems and remaining in office through 1988.

25X1

- During next six months
 ○ During next six months to two years

Legend

- Not of concern
 ○ Low concern
 ○ Moderate concern
 ● Substantial concern
 ● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ● | | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | | | | | | | |
| | Capital flight | | | | | | | | |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ● | ● | | | | | | |
| | Food/energy shortages | | | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Inflation | ● | | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | | | | | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307931 1-86

25X1

Secret**Argentina:****Selected Instability Indicators**

President Alfonsin has scored a string of successes in recent months, strengthening his political standing and aggravating disarray in the Peronist opposition. His party made a good showing in the fall congressional elections; he has reduced tensions in the military; and his austerity measures continue to limit inflation. Alfonsin could become vulnerable on the economic front, however, because he appears reluctant to implement structural reforms—such as the role of inefficient government enterprises—necessary for long-term economic growth.

25X1

*During next six months**During next six months to two years***Legend**

○ *Not of concern*
 ○ *Low concern*
 ○ *Moderate concern*

● *Substantial concern*
 ● *Serious concern*

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | | | | | | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | | | | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Capital flight | | | | | | | | |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | | | | | | | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | | |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | | | | | | |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307932 1-86

25X1

Secret

Secret

Chile:
Selected Instability Indicators

Bombings by far leftists have escalated in recent months, and the Communists and their allies now are targeting US Embassy personnel. Such activities are not at a regime-threatening level, but they are sure to test the security forces—whose morale has suffered as a result of scandals over death squad activities. Meanwhile, moderate opposition groups have failed to persuade the government to agree to an accelerated transition to civilian rule. And some in the military junta have told President Pinochet they will not support his remaining in office after his term expires in 1989.

25X1

○ During next six months
 ● During next six months to two years

Legend

○ Not of concern
 Low concern
 Moderate concern
 ● Substantial concern
 ● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | | | | | | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | | ● | ● | ● | ● | | |
| | Capital flight | | | | | | | | |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | | | | | | | ● | ● |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | | | | | | | |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ● | ● | | | | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Public support | | | | | | | | |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | | | | | | | |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | | | ○ | | | | ● | ● |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | | | | | | | | |
| | External support for opposition | | | | | | | | |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | | | | | | | | |
| | Security capabilities | | | | | | | | |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | | ○ | ○ | | | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | | | | | | | | |

307933 1-86

25X1

Secret**Spain:
Selected Instability Indicators**

The referendum on NATO membership, tentatively scheduled for March, will charge the political atmosphere and probably spark demonstrations throughout the country in opposition to NATO. We believe Prime Minister Gonzalez will weather the storm, even if voters reject his pro-NATO stance. High unemployment remains a serious problem and probably will increase as Gonzalez pursues his restructuring program and as Spain's membership in the EC forces it to compete with more efficient producers.

25X1

- ☐ During next six months
☐ During next six months to two years

Legend

- ☐ Not of concern
☐ Low concern
☐ Moderate concern
☒ Substantial concern
☒ Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | | | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Capital flight | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Food/energy shortages | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Inflation | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | | | | | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Public support | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| External factors | External support for government | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | External support for opposition | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Security capabilities | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Loss of legitimacy | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

307934 1-86

25X1

Secret

Secret

Greece:
Selected Instability Indicators

The downturn in the economy has forced the government of Prime Minister Papandreou to adopt a series of austerity measures—including real wage cuts, import restrictions, and a devaluation of the drachma. These measures have drawn criticism from labor unions, provoked strikes, and led to some dissension within the governing Socialist ranks. Nonetheless, with the opposition divided and Papandreou still in firm control of his party, there is no major threat to domestic stability.

25X1

- ☐ During next six months
☐ During next six months to two years

Legend

- ☐ Not of concern
☐ Low concern
☐ Moderate concern
☒ Substantial concern
☒ Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | <input type="radio"/> | | | | | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | | | | | | | |
| | Capital flight | | | | | | | | |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | |
| | Food/energy shortages | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Opposition activities | Inflation | | | | | | | | |
| | Organizational capabilities | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | | | | | |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | <input type="radio"/> | | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Military attitudes/activities | Public support | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | | | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | | | | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| External factors | External support for government | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | External support for opposition | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Security capabilities | <input type="radio"/> | | | | | | | |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | <input type="radio"/> | | | | | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| | Loss of legitimacy | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

307935 1-86

25X1

Secret

Secret**Turkey:****Selected Instability Indicators**

Prime Minister Ozal faces no near-term threat to his standing, even though he appears to be losing support to opposition groups on the right and left due to economic problems. []

[] Foreign relations issues involving Greece, Bulgaria, Syria, and Kurdish terrorists also hold potential for reducing public support for the government. []

25X6

25X6

25X6

25X6

25X1

*During next six months**During next six months to two years***Legend**

○ *Not of concern*
○ *Low concern*
○ *Moderate concern*

● *Substantial concern*
● *Serious concern*

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | | | | | | | | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ○ | ○ | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Capital flight | | | | | | | | |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | | | | | | |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Inflation | | | | | | | | |
| | Organizational capabilities | | | | | | | | |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | | | | | | | |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | | | | | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | | | | | | |
| Military attitudes/activities | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | | | | | | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | | | | |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | | | | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307936 1-86

25X1

Secret

Secret

Morocco:**Selected Instability Indicators**

Morocco will continue to face financial difficulties over the next several months. Rabat missed IMF performance targets and payments due creditors last quarter. It is also experiencing shortfalls in its key phosphates and agricultural exports. Additional retrenchment may spark campus and labor unrest early in 1986 as Morocco's volatile youth return to campus and labor contracts are renegotiated. Morocco's increasingly active Islamic extremists also may attempt to exploit the situation, but the regime's security forces appear capable of containing such mischief.

25X1

*During next six months**During next six months to two years***Legend**○ *Not of concern**Low concern**Moderate concern*● *Substantial concern*● *Serious concern*

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | | | | | | | | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ● | | | | | | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | | | | | | | |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | | | | | | | | |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | | | | | | | |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | | | | | | | | |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | | | | | | | |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | | | | |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | | | | | | | | |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | | | | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307937 1 86

25X1

Secret

Secret**Egypt:****Selected Instability Indicators**

Cairo's decision to attack the hijacked Egyptair plane in Malta with commandos has been viewed by many international observers as a necessary step, but the high loss of life—60 killed—has added to Mubarak's growing reputation among Egyptians for incompetence. If he is faced with a similar crisis in the near future, public discontent could erupt into civil unrest. Mubarak will attempt to implement needed austerity measures cautiously to avoid a repeat of the 1977 bread riots. He is prepared to deal harshly with Muslim fundamentalists and other potential agitators.

25X1

*During next six months**During next six months to two years***Legend**

○ Not of concern
 Low concern
 Moderate concern

● Substantial concern
 ● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | | | | ○ | | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | | | | | ○ | | |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | | | | | ● | ● |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | | | | | | ○ | | |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | | | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307938 1-86

25X1



Secret

Secret

Sudan:
Selected Instability Indicators


































































































































Khartoum's interim military regime has formalized a schedule for elections and the turnover to civilian rule by late April, despite the lack of preparedness on all sides. We believe there is an even chance that elections will be postponed or a new interim regime formed if tensions build and clashes between political parties disrupt campaigning. Meanwhile, a costly defeat by the southern rebels—who are receiving more support from Ethiopia—or civil unrest over economic grievances could provide a pretext for disaffected officers to mount a coup.

25X1

-  During next six months
 During next six months to two years

Legend

-  Not of concern
 Low concern
 Moderate concern
 Substantial concern
 Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | |  |  | | |  |  |
| | Capital flight | | |  |  | | | |  |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | | |  |  |  |  | | |
| | Food/energy shortages | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | Inflation | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | |  |  |  |  | |  |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | Public support | | |  |  |  |  | |  |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | |  |  |  |  | |  |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| External factors | External support for government | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | External support for opposition | | |  |  |  |  | |  |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | |  |  | |  |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | Security capabilities | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| | Loss of legitimacy | | |  |  |  |  | |  |

307939 1 86

25X1

Secret**Saudi Arabia:****Selected Instability Indicators**

The Saudi Government remains firmly in control, although reduced government spending is affecting the lifestyles of many Saudis. Popular criticism of the royal family—especially the King—is increasing. Riyadh is concerned about regional tensions precipitated by recent terrorist attacks and Israeli retaliation, and spillover of the Iran-Iraq war remains a threat. Oil revenues remain depressed, and OPEC's decision to defend a greater market share will probably keep oil prices sharply lower this year.

25X1

- *During next six months*
 ○ *During next six months to two years*

Legend

- *Not of concern* ● *Substantial concern*
 ○ *Low concern* ● *Serious concern*
 ○ *Moderate concern*

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307940 1-86

25X1

Secret

Secret

Iraq^a:**Selected Instability Indicators**

The regime in Iraq has been unable to end its five-year-old war against Iran, and the morale of its Army is depressed. A stubborn Kurdish insurgency in Iraq's northern provinces is spreading, and on the southern front Iran continues preparations for a major offensive. Sharply lower oil prices will seriously hurt the Iraqi economy and prompt requests for additional Saudi and Kuwaiti aid.

^a See Part 2 for detailed discussion.

25X1

- During next six months
● During next six months to two years

Legend

- Not of concern
● Substantial concern
● Low concern
● Serious concern
● Moderate concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | | | | | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | | | | | | | |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | | |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | | | | | ● | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | | | ● | ● | | ● |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | | | | | ● | ● | | ● |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● |
| | Security capabilities | | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | |

307941 1-86

25X1

Secret**Iran:****Selected Instability Indicators**

Khomeini's [] war weariness, continuing economic difficulties, and factional rivalries pose formidable challenges for Iran. The regime, nevertheless, is maintaining its oil exports from Khark Island despite frequent Iraqi attacks, and Khomeini recently has intervened to maintain a balance of power between radicals and conservatives on key issues. Harsh repression of antiwar demonstrators appears temporarily to have stifled overt expressions of dissent.

[]

25X1

25X1

- During next six months
 ● During next six months to two years

Legend

- Not of concern
 ○ Low concern
 ○ Moderate concern

- Substantial concern
 ● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | | | | | | | | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | | | | ● | ● | | ○ |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | | ● | ● |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | | | | | | ● | ● |
| | Capital flight | | | | | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | | | | | | | | |
| | Food/energy shortages | | | | | | | | |
| | Inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | | | | | | | |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | | | | | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | | | | | | | | |
| | Public support | | | | | | | | |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | | | | | | | | |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | | | | | | | |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | | | | | | | | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | | | | | | | | |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | | | | | | | | |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | | | | | | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | | | | | | |

307942 1-86

25X1

Secret

Secret

Pakistan:**Selected Instability Indicators**

President Zia's lifting of martial law on 30 December appears to have strengthened the stability of the Pakistani Government, at least for the near term. The new civilian system faces major problems early in its tenure, however, including increased political activity by newly legal opposition parties who are pressing Zia to resign his command of the Army. Meanwhile, the government has mounted paramilitary operations aimed at tightening its control in tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan.

25X1

*During next six months**During next six months to two years***Legend**

○ *Not of concern*
 ○ *Low concern*
 ○ *Moderate concern*

● *Substantial concern*
 ● *Serious concern*

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ● | | | ○ | | | | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ |
| | Capital flight | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | |
| | Inflation | | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | | | ○ | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | | | | | | | | |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | | ○ | | |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Loss of legitimacy | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307943 1.86

25X1

Secret

Secret**India:****Selected Instability Indicators**

Prospects for stability in India have been strengthened in recent months as religious discontent and terrorism have diminished. Prime Minister Gandhi's conciliatory initiatives to halt conflict in Assam and Punjab led to generally peaceful special elections in both states that were won by opposition parties. Stability in these troubled regions will heavily depend on the new leaders' abilities to contain recurrent violence growing out of successionist, sectarian, and ethnic issues.

25X1

During next six months
During next six months to two years

Legend

○ *Not of concern*
 ○ *Low concern*
 ○ *Moderate concern*

● *Substantial concern*
 ● *Serious concern*

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | | | | ● | ● | ● | ● | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | | | | | | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Capital flight | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | | | | | ● | ● | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | | ○ | | | | | |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | | | | | | | | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | | | | |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | | | | | | | | |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Loss of legitimacy | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307944 1-86

25X1

Secret

Secret

Nigeria:
Selected Instability Indicators

More than 50 officers were arrested and charged with coup-plotting in December. Babangida's popularity is declining in the wake of pay cuts and the exclusion of northerners from the government. Public opinion recently forced him to reject an IMF accord—many Nigerians oppose the austerity required by the accord. Even so, debts and low oil prices make politically risky cutbacks a certainty.

- During next six months
- During next six months to two years

Legend

- Not of concern
- Low concern
- Moderate concern
- Substantial concern
- Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Capital flight | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Food/energy shortages | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Opposition activities | Inflation | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | New category | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Repression/brutality | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Security capabilities | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Loss of legitimacy | | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |

307945 1-86

Secret

Secret

Somalia:

Selected Instability Indicators

President Siad continues in his 16th year in power to shrewdly manipulate tribal rivalries and retain the loyalty of key military and police units. Although criticism from senior government and party officials over the level of Western—particularly US—assistance is growing, Siad is keeping close tabs on his adversaries and is in no immediate danger. Nevertheless, he faces complex economic and political problems that—if not addressed—could unite his opponents and threaten his regime.

25X1

- During next six months
 ☆ During next six months to two years

Legend

- Not of concern ☆ Substantial concern
 ☆ Low concern ☆ Serious concern
 ☆ Moderate concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | ☆ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Inflation | ○ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ○ |
| | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ |
| | Security capabilities | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ | ☆ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307946 1-86

25X1

Secret

Secret

Kenya:
Selected Instability Indicators

Grumbling by the military over pay and appointments appears to have increased. The Kikuyu—Kenya's largest ethnic group—feels shortchanged by skewed Army recruiting quotas and the cancellation of a major papermill project in Kikuyuland. Additionally, more visible government corruption has marginally reduced public confidence in President Moi's government. In general, however, the level of disaffection probably remains manageable.

25X1

During next six months
During next six months to two years

Legend

○ *Not of concern* *Substantial concern*
 Low concern *Serious concern*
 Moderate concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | | | | | | | | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307947 1-86

25X1

Secret

Zaire:
Selected Instability Indicators

President Mobutu remains in firm control, although he continues to face daunting economic problems. Dissident activity in the east has declined in recent months, and a number of rebels have surrendered under Mobutu's amnesty program because of lack of supplies and poor morale. No incidents occurred during celebrations marking Mobutu's 20th year in power in November, but [redacted] the potential for Libyan-sponsored terrorist activity. [redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1

During next six months
During next six months to two years

Legend

Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern

● Substantial concern
● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | | | | | | | | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | | | | | | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | | | | | | | | |
| | Capital flight | | | | | | | | |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | | | | | | | | |
| | Food/energy shortages | | | | | | | | |
| Opposition activities | Inflation | | | | | | | | |
| | Organizational capabilities | | | | | | | | |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | | | | | | | |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | | | | | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | | | | | | | | |
| Military attitudes/activities | Public support | | | | | | | | |
| | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | | | | | | | | |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | | | | | | | |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | | | | | | | | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | | | | | | | | |
| External factors | External support for government | | | | | | | | |
| | External support for opposition | | | | | | | | |
| | Threat of military conflict | | | | | | | | |
| Regime actions/capabilities | | New category | | | | | | | |
| | Repression/brutality | | | | | | | | |
| | Security capabilities | | | | | | | | |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | | | | | | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | | | | | | | | |

307948 1-86

25X1

Secret

Secret

South Africa: Selected Instability Indicators

The limited reforms announced recently by President Botha will be insufficient to satisfy militant blacks and moderate current unrest. Antiapartheid violence and demonstrations will continue, and black schools may face a year of disruption as student leaders push for boycotts to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Soweto riots. Despite continued efforts to resolve the foreign debt crisis, we believe Pretoria will experience increasing economic isolation. Nevertheless, the determination of whites to retain power remains strong.

25X1

During next six months

During next six months to two years

Legend

○ Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern

● Substantial concern
● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | | | | | | | | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | ○ | | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | | ○ | | | | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ● | ● |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | | | ○ | ○ | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | | | | | | | | |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307949 1-86

25X1

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Secret

Philippines^a:
Selected Instability Indicators

When President Marcos announced his plan last November for an early presidential election, he indicated the measure was intended to move the country toward a new consensus and stability. There appears to be at least an equal risk, however, that the 7 February balloting and its aftermath could have the opposite effect. If Marcos is widely seen as blatantly rigging the election, the result could be escalating unrest over the next several months—and a boost to the Communist New People's Army insurgent movement.

^a See Part 2 for detailed discussion.

25X1

- During next six months
 ● During next six months to two years

Legend

- Not of concern
 Low concern
 Moderate concern
 ● Substantial concern
 ● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | | | | | | | | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | | | | | | | |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ● | ● | ● | | | | | |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | | |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | ● | ● | ● | ● | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | | | | | | | | |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | | | | | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | | | | | | ● | ● | ● |
| | Public support | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | | |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | | | | | ● | ● | ● |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | | | | | | | | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | |
| External factors | External support for government | | | | | | | | |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | |
| | Security capabilities | | | | | | | | |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | | ● | | | | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |

307950 1-86

25X1

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Secret

Indonesia:**Selected Instability Indicators**

Recent fires at several government-related facilities suggest a renewal of the antiregime arson campaign conducted in early 1985. The latest targets include four broadcasting stations, the Department of Religion, and a factory owned by President Soeharto's family. Stiff sentences for prominent dissidents in recent trials underscore the government's resolve—and ability—to contain potential opposition. Declining export revenues, however, continue to frustrate Jakarta's efforts to deal with already serious unemployment.

25X1

- During next six months
 ○ During next six months to two years

Legend

- Not of concern
 ○ Low concern
 ○ Moderate concern
- Substantial concern
 ● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | | | | | | |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | ○ | ○ | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | | | | | | | | |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Loss of legitimacy | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

307951 1-86

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South Korea:

Selected Instability Indicators

Concern for stability has been heightened by reports that President Chun is having second thoughts about stepping down in 1988 and may use student violence or other opposition activities as an excuse to crack down this spring. Some insiders in Seoul believe Chun may disband the Assembly and use new elections to install a more malleable parliamentary opposition—a move that could trigger widespread protests. Factionalism has set back opposition plans for a petition campaign in favor of direct presidential elections, but the government remains worried.

25X1

- During next six months
● During next six months to two years

Legend

- Not of concern
○ Low concern
○ Moderate concern

- Substantial concern
● Serious concern

| | | 1984 | | | | 1985 | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----|----|------|----|-----|----|
| | | I | II | III | IV | I | II | III | IV |
| Social change/conflict | Ethnic/religious discontent | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Demonstrations, riots, strikes | | | | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Economic factors | General deterioration | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | |
| | Decreased access to foreign funds | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Capital flight | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | |
| | Food/energy shortages | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Inflation | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Opposition activities | Organizational capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | | |
| | Opposition conspiracy/planning | | | | | | | | |
| | Terrorism and sabotage | | | | | | | | |
| | Insurgent armed attacks | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Public support | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| Military attitudes/activities | Threat to corporate military interests/dignity | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Discontent over government action/policies | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Reports/rumors of coup plotting | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| External factors | External support for government | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | External support for opposition | | | | | | | | |
| | Threat of military conflict | New category | | | | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Regime actions/capabilities | Repression/brutality | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | | |
| | Security capabilities | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| | Political disunity/loss of confidence | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | | | | |
| | Loss of legitimacy | | | | | | | | |

307952 1-86

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Part 2. Countries With Developments of Special Interest


The Philippines: Election and Beyond

- President Marcos's announcement last November of an early presidential election changed the country's political agenda. In December, his party pushed legislation through the National Assembly moving the election schedule up to 7 February from June 1987. Marcos was then nominated by the ruling party, and a widely respected assemblyman, Arturo Tolentino, was chosen as his running mate.
- The opposition united in December behind Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel in a last-ditch effort to form what many observers believed would be the most likely ticket to defeat Marcos.
- a worrisome picture for Marcos. Surveys taken over the past several months indicate that unless Marcos cheats, he will win by a slim margin at best. Several polls have shown him trailing, and one put Aquino comfortably ahead.
- During the campaign, Aquino has consistently drawn large and enthusiastic crowds nationwide. By contrast, Marcos has drawn meager crowds and has campaigned on a limited schedule because of health problems.
- Marcos's political machine, however, has outspent the opposition by perhaps 30 times, and he retains control of the country's political levers, making him the favorite to win.

Comment

Marcos's call for an early election last November initially focused attention away from the country's seriously depressed economy and rapidly growing Communist insurgency. The announcement almost certainly was designed to reduce US pressure for

Projected Election Winner by Region



broad economic, political, and military reform. His domestic calculations probably were based largely on the results of polls taken last summer that indicated he would easily win an early election. Marcos doubtless believed that the opposition—which had been badly fragmented—would fail to agree on a single ticket.

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President Marcos and his wife.

A blatantly fraudulent election victory for Marcos almost certainly would cost him the political capital he has gained with his foreign and domestic critics since calling for an early ballot. Moreover, the perception of massive cheating could spur widespread—and possibly violent—protests among the Philippine electorate. Aquino has publicly threatened to call for demonstrations if she believes she has been cheated, and Marcos could be forced to turn to the military to restore public order. Moderates probably would become disillusioned with the political process, and some might shift their support increasingly to Communist Party front organizations. The Communist Party would have a better chance of tapping popular disaffection, stemming from what they proclaim to be a



Presidential candidates.

US-backed Marcos victory, and could parlay it into recruitment gains for the insurgency.

In the less likely event that Marcos wins a relatively clean election by Philippine standards, we expect antigovernment protests to be less serious—at least initially. Citing his electoral mandate, we judge that Marcos will be even more resistant to pressure from foreign and domestic critics for broad reform. In our view, he probably would emerge from such a victory more beholden to rightwing allies such as industrialist Eduardo Cojuangco—a circumstance that will make it more difficult for him to initiate reforms since they would adversely affect the interests of his loyalists. With the election behind them, the opposition probably would fractionalize into its preelection status making a united effort less likely in local elections later this year.

Given the large number of undecided voters in recent polls and the lack of precedent for such an electoral contest, Marcos could miscalculate his opponent's voting appeal and be confronted with a surprise Aquino victory. If this happens, we believe Marcos would be tempted to declare the election invalid, using his control of the election commission and the Supreme Court to effect such a move. This undoubtedly would spark widespread unrest. An Aquino victory also would increase the chances that Marcos's supporters in the military—who reportedly are concerned about Aquino's alleged ties to the Communists—might attempt a coup.

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Should Aquino be permitted to assume power, she would face a daunting list of pressing national problems and formidable obstacles to consolidating her power. Aquino would have to move quickly to cut deals with leaders in the still divided opposition as well as with key people in Marcos's party and the military. She also would have to decide how to manage those Marcos supporters with whom she cannot cut a deal. Moreover, if she proceeds to put Marcos and his close associates on trial—as she has threatened—the military almost certainly would intervene. []

We see a small chance that an Aquino administration would have a stabilizing impact on the political climate. The Communist Party, for example, would face a dilemma. So far, Communist strategy—concentrating on political organization while mounting enough military operations to discredit the government—has been based on the assumption Marcos would continue to rule at least through the previously scheduled 1987 election. With Aquino at the helm, these calculations may change. If she begins implementing reforms that undercut the party's mass base or mounts an effective counterinsurgency program, party leaders would have to decide whether to make a deal with Aquino—in hopes of gaining a foothold in the government—or to mount massive military operations aimed at destabilizing her fledgling administration. []

There is also the possibility of an Aquino defeat but victory for her running mate, Salvador Laurel. A recent survey shows Laurel leading Tolentino by 4 percentage points, and, [] some ruling party officials would favor this development. In view of Marcos's []

[] frailty he has shown in the final weeks of the campaign, Laurel's victory could pave the way for a less contentious succession should Marcos become incapacitated in the next several weeks. Laurel's family has had close ties to Marcos over the years, and, in our judgment, the ruling elite may perceive Laurel as someone who would accommodate their interests. []

Key Indicators To Watch

Prospective Scenario: Marcos wins a fraudulent election; most opposition leaders see real prospects for reform blocked; and the insurgency gains strength

- Marcos's machine turns out the vote on election day, securing 60 percent or more of the vote.
- Charges of fraud emerge in selected regions; the National Citizens' Movement for Free Election documents incidents of fraud.
- Certification of election results takes longer than one week.
- Antigovernment demonstrations are broad-based, involving the military in some clashes.
- The influence of Marcos's rightwing cronies becomes increasingly apparent, and a shakeup of his party and the military weed out those perceived as wavering in loyalty to Marcos.
- Moderates flirt with Communist front groups, and the insurgency gains more recruits. []

25X1

25X1

Alternative Scenario: The elections are conducted in a relatively fair manner; the victor shows a greater willingness to compromise; radical left loses its appeal

- Election observers note the relative fairness of the election.
- Both government and opposition leaders dampen their political rhetoric and reiterate their commitment to the democratic process.
- Aquino, if the victor, placates Marcos's supporters with a conciliatory program and agrees not to pursue past abuses.
- Marcos, if the victor, appoints a few opposition members to government positions and retires General Ver.
- The Communist Party solicits external advice on how to increase its popular appeal. []

25X1

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25X6

25X6

25X6

25X1

25X1

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Secret

Iraq: Mounting Difficulties Undercut Military and Civilian Morale

- Iraq has been unable to devise a successful strategy for forcing an end to its five-year-old war with Iran, and morale—both at home and on the battlefield—is brittle.
- The Iraqis have attacked, but not destroyed, Khark Island—Iran's major oil exporting facility—and Tehran has succeeded in restoring oil exports to near normal levels. Another major Iranian offensive is in preparation and could come at any time.
- The Saddam regime has failed to contain a growing insurgency in the north, which is supported by Iran, and there is mounting evidence that the two principal Kurdish-inhabited area guerrilla groups have entered into an alliance.
- Iraq faces financial difficulties that will be aggravated by a sustained reduction in oil prices.



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Comment

The Iranian-imposed war of attrition is putting increasing stress on Iraqi society and institutions. Iran's military pressure forces Baghdad to maintain a constant state of alert, which is seriously testing the morale of its frontline troops. At the same time, morale on the homefront has become steadily more depressed, as the Iraqi public confronts the prospect of a seemingly endless war.

As part of its war of attrition, Iran is supporting Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. Early last year, the Iraqi Army attempted to crush the insurgency with a major offensive. The Army struck at selected civilian targets in an effort to end grassroots support for the guerrillas, but these harsh tactics backfired and instead caused the rebellion to spread.

Heavy snow currently blankets the Kurdish-inhabited area, curtailing rebel activity temporarily. The fighters almost certainly will resume operations in the

spring, and this will force Baghdad to put its own forces in the field again. Meanwhile, Embassy reporting indicates that the two major guerrilla groups—the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan—have ended their longstanding feud and have begun to coordinate their operations. The two groups have a total of about 8,000 combatants.

25X1

On the southern front the Iranians—who outnumber the Iraqis and many of whom remain motivated by revolutionary zeal—continue to threaten a major invasion. The Iraqis doubtless will fight hard—and be willing to pay the price in casualties required to defend their own territory—but they are reluctant to risk the heavy losses needed to attempt a knockout offensive blow.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Ceremonies honoring war dead.

Iraq increased attacks on vital Iranian targets last summer, including Khark Island, in an effort to force Tehran to the negotiating table. Baghdad held back from completely destroying Khark, however, fearing this would strengthen Iran's resolve and hasten its search for other means of exporting its oil. The Khomeini regime is developing alternative export routes in any event, and has made sufficient repairs to damaged installations on Khark Island to restore its shipments to preattack levels.

Iraq has maintained living standards by borrowing heavily on the promise of its own increased oil export capacity. In October, it opened a new pipeline through Saudi Arabia, and more pipelines are planned by the end of 1987. The likelihood of a steep drop in oil prices, however, has clouded Baghdad's economic prospects. If oil prices remain below \$24 per barrel, Iraq will find it difficult to meet its debt payments or secure additional loans. It may be forced to make politically risky cuts in domestic spending.

Saddam and other leaders in Baghdad face a deepening dilemma. They fear that Iraqi morale would not support an all-out military effort; we agree that Iraqi forces and society would balk at taking such large-scale losses. Allowing the war to drag on, however, will increase civilian and military dissatisfaction with the regime's management of the war and could spur calls for a change in strategy. This, in turn, would shake the regime's confidence. We do not believe a collapse of will in Iraq is imminent, but time does not appear to be on the Iraqis' side.

Key Indicators To Watch

Prospective Scenario: Iraq continues its cautious policy of trying to force Iran to the table with measured military pressure on its economic lifelines

- Iraq continues high-altitude attacks on Khark Island but inflicts only limited damage.
- Iraq builds up its land defenses along its border with Iran, but does not pursue an offensive strategy.
- Iraq's Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz continues to lobby with foreign governments for a cutoff of arms to Iran and the imposition of economic sanctions on Tehran.
- Iraq continues to call on the United States and the Soviet Union to force Iran to talk peace.

25X1
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Alternative Scenario: The Iraqis decide to move more boldly to force a decision in the war

- Prominent members of the regime visit friendly Arab capitals and warn that continued Iranian intransigence requires drastic action to end the war.
- Hardliners in the Iraqi regime, such as First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan, speak out on foreign policy, while moderates like Foreign Minister Aziz keep a low profile.
- Iraq intensifies attacks on oil facilities at Khark Island and moves larger concentrations of ground forces up to the front.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

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Guatemala: Moderate Leftist President Cerezo Seeking Consensus

- Christian Democratic President Vinicio Cerezo, who won a decisive victory in the 8 December runoff election, has been striving hard to reassure key business and military leaders about his moderate credentials. Cerezo—seen by many of these leaders as a leftist—defeated centrist Jorge Carpio by a 2-to-1 margin. Cerezo's party also won 51 seats in the new 100-member Congress. [redacted]

- [redacted]
[redacted] no major insurgent disturbances were reported. International observers noted that the balloting was free of fraud and military interference. [redacted]

- Cerezo has emphasized the need to forge a consensus on such potentially contentious issues as economic reform and the military's counterinsurgency campaign. Nevertheless, he has not outlined an economic program and is relying on large infusions of foreign aid from Western and Latin American governments to forestall further economic decline. [redacted]

- In a preinauguration visit to Washington, Cerezo pressed for economic assistance but stated that he opposes US military action in Central America. He also publicly indicated he supports Contadora and announced plans to pursue a policy of "active neutrality" in the region. [redacted]

Comment

Cerezo must contend with serious economic problems and political challenges early in his administration. If mismanaged, these tests could quickly erode his impressive electoral mandate. Cerezo's most formidable potential opposition comes from distrustful military officers and Guatemala's economic elite, many of whom regard him as a threat to their interests. At the same time, he faces challenges from extremist groups on both the left and the right. As a result, we believe



Vinicio Cerezo signaling victory in Guatemala City. [redacted]

Cerezo has limited maneuverability in tackling the country's severe economic problems, asserting civilian control over the military, and following through on his commitment to improve human rights. [redacted]

Cerezo publicly has pledged to implement a comprehensive economic stabilization package, including exchange rate unification, but he studiously has avoided indicating specific measures. His predecessor's attempts to institute badly needed economic reforms met strong opposition from the business community, ultimately forcing retraction. Cerezo failed to build support for austerity before taking office and, in our judgment, he will face similar difficulties in winning private-sector support for government intervention in the largely free-enterprise economy. The release of much-needed assistance by international lenders and donors is likely to require a commitment to economic reform. [redacted]

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Cerezo also must wrestle with demands from organized labor and teachers who have threatened to renew strikes if he does not modify government policy on price controls and wage increases. Although we believe there is only a modest prospect of widespread civil unrest during the first six months of Cerezo's term, we judge it will increase significantly if these demands are not met at least partially. Domestic discontent—as seen in last September's demonstrations over consumer price increases—could intensify quickly and lead to greater polarization. So far, the insurgents are taking a wait-and-see attitude toward the new government; a faltering Cerezo, however, could provide impetus to increased activity. []

Although the military upheld its commitment to oversee the transition to civilian rule, Cerezo has recognized publicly that the armed forces remain the ultimate political power. We believe he will hold out the prospect of renewed US military aid under his regime in order to win greater support from the Army. Cerezo also appears sensitive to military concerns that he not interfere with the counterinsurgency program, open direct talks with the guerrillas, nor punish military officers for human rights abuses. []

Observers—both at home and abroad—will be watching closely to see if Cerezo makes promised improvements in human rights. In our judgment, he will move forward cautiously in responding to demands that he account for missing persons and punish those in the security forces responsible for past abuses. There are indications that rightwing extremists may be prepared to launch a campaign of terror designed to embarrass the government and create an atmosphere of fear. Thus, Cerezo has announced plans to disband the unpopular Directorate of Technical Investigations and reorganize the National Police, but he is unlikely to tamper with the military security police forces. []

Cerezo is likely to attempt to craft what he sees as a more “balanced” regional policy. We believe any attempt to increase Guatemala's involvement in the region, however—including his proposal to create a Central American Parliament—will be tempered by his recognition of the military's continued opposition to an activist regional role and the need to maintain

good relations with Mexico. In our judgment, Cerezo probably will try to use his moderate leftist image to court better relations with Mexico and other Central American neighbors, including Nicaragua and Cuba, without endangering prospects for increased US and international economic support. []

Key Indicators To Watch

Prospective Scenario: Cerezo pursues a moderately reformist path

- Cerezo, recognizing the limits of his political power, pushes for moderate economic stabilization measures and avoids direct interference in military affairs.
- International donors provide increased assistance and debt relief.
- Cerezo ensures that the government's human rights performance improves by ending the worst abuses, but Guatemalan society continues to be characterized by violence.
- Rightwing political cohesion continues to dissipate and extremists fail to win military support for a coup.
- Labor strikes and demonstrations occur sporadically, but at manageable levels; the government is not required to use force to contain them. []

Alternative Scenario: Cerezo adopts an aggressive reform program

- Cerezo presses for sweeping economic reform legislation, despite strong private-sector opposition.
- Foreign assistance fails to materialize and a deepening economic crisis sparks labor and civil unrest.
- Increased guerrilla activity and rightwing violence produce the perception within the military that the government is losing control.
- Cerezo moves quickly and with a heavy hand to control the military; coup plotting increases. []

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Peru: President Garcia's Honeymoon Fading

- President Garcia's unprecedented popularity with the Peruvian public continues to provide his best protection from opposition challenges.
- The honeymoon period for Garcia's presidency, nonetheless, has begun to fade; his relations with the security services have been strained by his reformist policies, anticorruption campaign, and his failure to formulate a clear counterinsurgency strategy.
- These problems come at a time when Garcia faces growing pressure from the middle class to address security concerns, especially to protect Lima from increasing terrorist attacks.
- Garcia's one-man decisionmaking style and unpredictable actions also have antagonized Communist-dominated trade unions, the political left, and even some members of his own government and party.
- The government's nationalistic economic policies, while popular, have done little to boost economic recovery. Lima's hardline stance on debt, combined with the recent takeover of a US oil company, will further discourage badly needed foreign investment.

Comment

President Garcia's crackdown on human rights violations and his lack of attention to military needs in particular have rankled the Peruvian armed forces. Last fall, he dismissed three top military commanders following revelations of a massacre in Ayacucho in which 69 villagers were killed. He has undertaken a large-scale cleanup of corruption in the police forces, which play a key antiterrorist role, by dismissing hundreds of officers. His determination to cut defense expenditures also has strained civil-military relations. Senior military officials have criticized Garcia for making declarations on disarmament and austerity without first consulting them.




The new President's personal popularity has discouraged active coup plotting, but the security services may be resisting Garcia passively. For example, the Army is reportedly putting counterinsurgency efforts on hold until the government provides clearer policy directives. This wait-and-see attitude, combined with police demoralization resulting from the anticorruption purge, could hamper government efforts to stem subversion.

The five-year-old Sendero Luminoso insurgency, meanwhile, has shifted from a predominantly rural to an increasingly urban movement. In 1985, terrorist

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incidents dropped by 60 percent in the traditional highland battleground of Ayacucho and jumped by a similar percentage in Lima. Last November, the anti-US Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, following a temporary truce with the government, resumed its terrorist campaign in Lima. Its primary targets have included ruling party offices, banks, and government buildings, as well as US official and commercial interests. [REDACTED]

Both Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru now appear intent upon challenging the new government by demonstrating their ability to strike selectively at targets in the capital. While they cannot overthrow the Garcia government, they are trying to undermine its authority, provoke acts of military and police repression, and aggravate tensions already present in civil-military relations. There is no persuasive evidence of cooperation between the two insurgent groups nor of clear external links. [REDACTED]

Organized labor is also adopting more aggressive tactics, even though efforts by the Communist-dominated unions to mount strikes and demonstrations against the government so far have attracted only lukewarm rank-and-file support. In December the two most radical unions—closely linked to the extreme-left parties in the Marxist United Left coalition—vowed to launch a spring offensive against the government if their demands were not met. The government's budget constraints probably will not permit Garcia to grant large enough wage hikes to avert strikes and demonstrations this spring. A successful strike by Peru's government workers could hinder public services and embarrass the President, but a crippling general strike in the near term is unlikely.

Garcia is having unexpected difficulty managing his own party, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance. He has aroused harsh criticism from fellow party members for bypassing the legislative branch, failing to consult on important policy matters, and not putting enough party professionals in key positions. Continuing rancor within the ruling party could weaken Garcia's political base and incite greater activism by labor and the far-left opposition. [REDACTED]

Finally, Peru's debilitated economy continues to pose the potential for prompting social unrest. Lima needs foreign aid and investment to spur development, but Garcia's decision limiting debt repayment to 10 percent of annual exports has jeopardized relations with Western governments, foreign commercial creditors, and global financial institutions. Only Italian and Swiss banks have renewed trade credits since Peruvian loans were further downgraded by the United States last October, according to the US Embassy. [REDACTED]

Peru's takeover of a US oil firm in late December—which may activate US legislation invoking punitive measures if there is no prompt and adequate recompense—imperils future bilateral economic and commercial ties. Foreign investment probably will remain elusive even if Peru makes fair compensation. In

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addition, although the government's imposition of price and exchange controls has slowed inflation and capital flight, Garcia probably will face growing popular demand in 1986 for improved living standards. His crackdown on a burgeoning illegal narcotics industry will affect peasant livelihoods, unless he can increase substantially funds for land reform and crop substitution programs.

- Terrorism continues to plague Peru, but the insurgency is hampered by recruitment difficulties, chronic shortages of weapons and ammunition, and security forces countermeasures.

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Indicators To Watch

Prospective Scenario: Garcia's popularity declines and governmental authority deteriorates under increasing domestic and international pressures

- Public opinion polls show a decrease in Garcia's popularity.
- Calls for strike action by Communist-dominated unions are supported by the rank and file, and the opposition parties become increasingly strident in their criticism of Garcia's performance.
- Rumors of military coup plotting start to circulate in the capital.
- Relations between Peru and the United States become increasingly strained, and the flow of aid and trade is adversely affected.
- Peru's credit lines and sources of foreign capital continue to shrink.
- Insurgent groups escalate terrorist attacks.

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Alternative Scenario: Garcia's popularity remains fairly high and his administration regains positive momentum with achievements in political, economic, and military areas

- Public opinion polls continue to show high ratings for Garcia.
- Labor leaders call for strikes, but the workers hesitate and the United Left coalition remains immobilized by internal divisions.
- The military grumbles about damage to its prestige but abstains from coup plotting because of Garcia's standing with the public.
- Relations with the United States are uninterrupted by any cutoffs of assistance and trade, and a political dialogue is continued.
- Garcia's efforts to revive the economy and his assurances that Peru will eventually pay its debts mollify the international banking community.

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Part 3. Indicators of Political Instability

The following indicators were used in our examination of each of the countries treated in this publication. While these factors—especially if taken individually—may not be predictive of instability for any single, given country, they have been associated with political instability in the past. We will continue refining these indicators to make them more specific to each country and more predictive.

Social Change/ Conflict Indicators

Demonstrations and Riots

1. Are demonstrations/riots increasing in frequency, scale, and scope?
2. Is the government taking a more permissive view of the demonstrations/riots? If so, does this account in part for the increase? Or is it having a calming effect?
3. Are government repression and opposition violence escalating?
4. Is the violence in demonstrations/riots indiscriminate? Is it being directed against the government, a scapegoat minority or religious community, or other group?
5. Are demonstrations starting to assume a general antiregime tone, or do they focus on one specific issue, a minority group, or a particular region?
6. Does a demonstration attract a larger crowd than originally predicted? Does a demonstration called by one opposition group attract the genuine—not manipulated—support of other groups not previously involved, such as labor groups in support of student marchers, and so forth?
7. Are the media:
 - Becoming more critical of the government or supportive of the demonstrators/rioters?
 - Ignoring government guidance in their reporting of the incidents?

8. Are there indications that elements of the political elite or the security forces are beginning to sympathize with the demonstrators/rioters?

9. Is the government making concessions to the demonstrators/rioters for the first time? If so, are these having a calming effect, or are they seen as a sign of weakness?

10. Are the demonstrators/rioters disrupting any area of the economy? If so, does the concerned sector blame the government or the demonstrators/rioters? Are the disruptions affecting the government's ability to provide goods and services, patronage, and so forth?

Strikes and Other Job Action

11. Are strikes, slowdowns, sit-ins, and so forth, increasing in number, frequency, and location?
12. Do the strikers have political objectives apart from economic motivations? If so, are these directed against the government?
13. Are labor groups that oppose the government forging links with nonlabor opposition groups?
14. Are the strikes and other job actions drawing increasing support from the general public?
15. Is the government starting to meet the workers' demands despite sound economic reasons that it not do so? If so, have the concessions persuaded workers to return to work?
16. Are the strikes, and so forth, starting to hurt the economy?

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Secret***Maintenance of National Unity***

17. Do increasingly large numbers of the public tend to sympathize with the demonstrators/rioters?

18. Is effective government control over some areas outside the capital being eroded? Are local officials increasingly unwilling or unable to implement directives from or to perform services, such as tax collection, for the central government?

19. Is the government starting to carry out policies that change the political or social status of any group; for example, is it increasing religious intolerance, suppressing the use of a minority language or culture, and so forth? If so, are the policies compelling those affected to oppose the government in any way?

20. Is the middle or merchant class starting to withdraw its support for the government?

21. Are religious leaders increasingly critical of the state of the nation? If so:

- Are religious figures becoming active in antigovernment activities?
- Is the general public beginning to support these activities and agree with the criticisms?

**Economic Stability
Indicators**

22. Is the government losing its ability to generate revenues? If so, is it finding difficulty in providing public services or maintaining popular subsidies?

23. Is the government increasingly turning to money creation to finance its operations?

24. Is the general public blaming the government for the deteriorating economy?

25. Are sudden price rises or drops in food or energy supplies likely or increasing?

26. Is the international economic situation starting to depress the local economy? If so:

- Is only one sector affected, or is the populace hurting across the board?

- Do popular perceptions tend to blame pernicious international forces or countries?

27. Have remittances from expatriots assumed an important place in the economy?

28. Is the government's ability to obtain foreign aid and investment starting to decline?

29. Does the economy include a traditional sector, such as subsistence agriculture and barter, that remains isolated from the modern economic sector and that could provide a safety valve in times of crisis? If so, is this being eroded by overpopulation, landlessness, crop specialization, and so forth?

30. Do the country's reserves or the free market exchange rate reflect capital flight? If so, is the capital flight the result of economic reasons, such as lack of return on investments, or because of political fears?

31. Is the government unlikely to meet its debt service repayment obligations? If so, are the government's creditors willing to reschedule all or part of the debt?

32. Is the government starting to implement its own or IMF-imposed austerity measures? If so, can it withstand pressures from opposing domestic interests?

33. Are the government's economic policies benefiting only a small segment of the population, such as the elite and associated groups?

34. Conversely, are attempts to redress inequality through taxation, land reform, anticorruption drives, or other economic measures alienating important elements of the elite, such as the military or clergy?

**Opposition Groups
Indicators**

35. Are opposition groups coalescing against the government? Are they increasingly able to mobilize large numbers of people for antiregime activities?

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36. If opposition groups are organized along class, ethnic, religious, or regional lines, are these factional forces and their attraction growing?

37. Is any opposition group representing itself as the embodiment of the national identity?

38. Is a polarization of forces taking place, that is, are centrists and moderates increasingly compelled to choose among radical positions?

39. Is separatism a growing issue?

40. Is there an opposition leader whose charisma is increasingly recognized even by those who oppose him?

41. Are opposition parties increasingly claiming that the violent overthrow of the government is the only way to bring about change?

42. Are the intellectuals becoming alienated from the system? If so, does this lend strength to the opposition?

Terrorism and Sabotage

43. Are incidents increasing in frequency and intensity? If so, what has been the rate of increase in:

- The number of incidents?
- The number of cities or provinces in which incidents occur?

44. Are the terrorists or saboteurs being indiscriminate or selective in their targets? If selective, who are the targets—government supporters, the opposition, perceived traitors to one or another side, or others?

45. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to deter any part of the general public from supporting the government?

46. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to hurt the economy? If so:

- Is production declining in key areas such as energy?
- Is the government's ability to provide goods, services, and patronage being reduced?

Military Attitudes/ Activities Indicators

47. Are there any signs of antiregime or coup plotting?

48. Are there indications that elements in the military and security services, particularly senior personnel, are becoming discontented over government actions or policies?

49. Are the corporate interests or dignity of the military being assaulted or threatened?

50. Are there elements in the military that are discontented over career loss, pay, or other benefits?

51. Are there signs of a split within or between military or police leaders?

52. Are the military or security services becoming less disciplined; are desertions and acts of disobedience, and so forth, increasing?

53. Are the security services being reorganized frequently or to an extent that affects their efficiency and morale?

54. Are expenditures for the military and security services a strain on the budget?

55. Is the government trying to upgrade the efficiency and morale of the military and police through such measures as:

- Better recruitment, pay, leave, and promotion policies?
- Increased training in dealing with civil disobedience?
- Better equipment?

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Secret**External Factors
Indicators**

56. Are foreign influence and aid being viewed negatively by the public and by influential power groups? If so, is this starting to hurt the regime?

57. Is the opposition receiving increased aid from radical foreign sources? Is the increased aid improving the recipients' capabilities, or is it evoking negative responses from any groups, indicating that they feel their interests are threatened?

58. Are neighboring countries or other external influences beginning to affect sectarian or regional groups in a way that is eroding loyalty to the government?

59. Is the government under threat of incursions or subversion by foreign elements?

60. Are other countries starting to pose a military threat? If so, does this enable the government to "wrap itself in the flag" and rally support it might otherwise have lost?

61. Is the public's mind being taken off deteriorating domestic conditions by the government's overseas adventures? Or, is the government's meddling abroad unpopular at home?

62. Is an influx of foreign refugees creating problems?

**Regime Capabilities and
Actions Indicators*****Repression of the Opposition***

63. Does the general public increasingly see the government as more responsible than opposition groups for perpetrating domestic violence?

64. Is the government increasing the use of repression to counter opposition activities? Is there more torture, imprisonment without trial, banning of political parties, press censorship, or school and university closings?

65. Are the regular police having difficulty putting down demonstrations or riots? If so, is the government increasingly using paramilitary police units, hired thugs, or military forces?

66. Are government officials talking about the possibility of declaring martial law or perpetuating it?

67. If the government uses massive force, does this disrupt opposition groups and make them less effective? What is its effect on the general public: is it seen as a necessary sign of firmness, or is it seen as brutal and repressive?

68. Are there indications that the public sees the government as inconsistent: for example, does the average citizen complain that he has "no way of knowing what he can or cannot do to stay out of trouble?"

Government Leadership and the Ruling Elite

69. Is conflict breaking out or increasing among groups that make up the ruling elite or between the ruling and supporting elites?

70. Are there indications that government leaders are doubting their major policies or their ability to rule?

71. Are there any indications that the ruler may be considering stepping down because of age, ill health, a shift in public opinion, personal tragedy, and so forth? If so, is the political elite gearing up for an obvious succession crisis?

72. Is the ruler's style changing in such a way that lessens his ability to rule? Is he increasingly isolated in the "palace," becoming erratic, or losing his party's loyalty?

73. Is a weak coalition government leading to legislative paralysis?

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74. Has the ruler shown that he is prepared to use the security forces to suppress demonstrations, riots, strikes, and so forth? If so, is he prepared to take extremely tough measures before the situation gets out of hand?

75. Is the government introducing reforms? If so, is it doing so under pressure or at its own initiative, and is it prepared to enforce them?

76. Are media criticism of and jokes about the ruler and the government becoming more direct and open?

84. Are conditions in the country generally deteriorating to such an extent that the business sector is expressing doubt about the government's ability to rule?

85. Is a substantial segment of the business sector starting to support the opposition? If so, is this support political, financial, or both?

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Government Bureaucracy

77. Is the bureaucracy becoming less loyal to the government leadership because of divergent political views, distaste for the government's policies, and so forth?

78. Is effectiveness being eroded because the leadership is firing competent officials as scapegoats?

79. Has the government shown ineptitude in coping with natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, crop failures, and so forth?

The Education System

80. Is the education system turning out too many graduates in relation to employment opportunities?

81. Are students becoming restive because of government repression or because of restrictive policies in the educational area?

82. Are fundamentalists or other religious groups starting to set up schools in opposition to the public school system, or is enrollment increasing at such schools already in existence?

The Business Sector

83. Is the business sector starting to be hurt by specific government policies? If so, are losses sufficiently serious to make businessmen increasingly critical of these policies?

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